Using Actual Legal Work to Teach
Legal Research and Writing
Michael A. Millemann
Legal research and writing (LRW) teachers should use actual legal work to
teach their courses, including (indeed, especially) first-year courses.1 The legal
work might come from a planned or ongoing lawsuit, transaction, or other
matter. What is important is that it is real, although in my model, the teacher can
add hypothetical features to customize the legal work to the particular LRW
course. For example, in an appellate advocacy course, the teacher could present
the legal issues arising out of a pretrial matter by summarily “deciding” them in a
hypothetical trial court opinion, thus allowing the students to fully explore them
in their appellate briefs and oral arguments.
It also is important that the students’ work be useful or potentially useful to
people or organizations that need legal assistance. This gives students a sense of
personal responsibility for the legal problems of another, substantially enhancing
and diversifying the educational experience by strongly motivating students to do
their best work.
The LRW teacher need not personally represent the client. In one model, a
LRW teacher who does not represent the client might co-teach with a clinical
teacher who does. Below, I describe two courses that fit this model, and I offer
several arguments in support of it.
When the LRW instructor teaches by herself, she can cull the assignments
from actual legal work provided by a “referring” lawyer. The offered assistance
of the LRW teacher and students might be the inducement the lawyer needs to
take on the matter, or it might allow the lawyer to expand the representation to
include other clients or a class of people.
The best models, I believe, can be created jointly by LRW and clinical
teachers. Sixty years ago, Jerome Frank criticized legal education for its obsession
with the appellate case method: “If it were not for a tradition which blinds us,
would we not consider it ridiculous that, with litigation laboratories [courthouses]
just around the corner, law schools confine their students to what they can learn
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about litigation in books?”2 Today, the laboratories are inside law schools in the
form of clinics. Partnerships between LRW and clinical teachers offer many
reciprocal benefits. In what follows, I describe these benefits. I begin, however,
by describing the two experimental LRW courses that Professor Steven Schwinn
and I developed and taught with actual legal work.

I. Experimental LRW Courses Taught with
Actual Legal Work
A. A third-semester appellate advocacy course,
LRW III
The first course we co-taught was the third and final course in our LRW
sequence: a two-credit, third-semester appellate advocacy course, which I will call
“LRW III.”3 We developed the issues for the LRW students’ appellate briefs and
oral arguments from a post-conviction matter, which had not yet been filed and
which a newly created post-conviction clinic was handling. I was the supervisor
in that clinic as well. When we began work on the case, our client, whom I shall
call “Mr. Anthony,” had been incarcerated for thirty-five years for a murder he
did not commit. We used the students’ work to persuade the governor to
commute Mr. Anthony’s sentence, in effect, to time served, resulting in his
release from prison.
We developed this experimental LRW III course and the post-conviction
clinic together. The LRW students were the research and writing arm of the
enterprise, but they did not represent Mr. Anthony. The clinical students were
responsible for interviewing, counseling, and otherwise representing their client
under the State’s student practice rule. They did this with the help of the LRW
students’ work product.
The record in Mr. Anthony’s case included the trial transcript, appellate
briefs, and previously filed post-conviction papers. We added new information as
the clinical students developed it. In the middle of the semester, we froze the
record for the LRW students to give them a fixed record for their appellate briefs
and arguments. We identified the facts that were “in play” and added some
“stipulated facts.”
Professor Schwinn and I identified seven legal issues for the LRW students
and divided the twenty-seven students into seven work groups, assigning one
issue to each group. Within each group, we assigned a team of two students to
represent the client, and two (in one case, one) to represent the State. Although
“co-counsel” worked together, each was responsible for his or her own final brief
2

Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 Yale L.J. 1303, 1311 (1947).
At the time, Maryland Law School called its three courses “Legal Analysis, Writing, and
Research,” or “LAWR,” courses. I will refer to them more generically as “Legal Research and
Writing,” or “LRW,” courses.
3
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and oral argument.
Using a clinical case “rounds” method, which engages faculty and students
jointly as problem solvers (the analogy is to doctors in teaching hospitals), we
met weekly with each of the seven groups, each of which also included one
student from the post-conviction clinic. Many of the most interesting and
important discussions occurred in these sessions. “Opposing” counsel,
augmented by the clinical student in each work group, explored the strengths and
weaknesses of the arguments, and in this give and take refined their final
arguments. This process considerably enhanced the quality of the actual
representation that the clinical students and I were able to provide to Mr.
Anthony.

B. A second-semester pretrial litigation course,
LRW II
The second course Professor Schwinn and I co-taught was a hybrid. We
began with the two-credit, second-semester LRW II course, which focused on
pleadings in civil pretrial litigation. To teach this course, LRW II teachers
normally used a well-developed hypothetical civil case. Instead, we drew the
assignments from five actual police brutality cases (involving alleged
constitutional torts) and from litigation planned by a public interest organization
in which plaintiffs would seek to create a constitutional right to counsel in some
civil cases.4
We added a three-credit “Legal Theory and Practice” component to the
LRW II course.5 Through these clinical components, teachers use actual legal
work to enhance theoretical analysis, while the teachers and students provide
legal services to poor and underrepresented persons and communities. The
teachers use the practice experiences to critically analyze access-to-justice,
professional responsibility, and other systemic issues.6
We had fifteen students in the course, all of whom selected it as their
4 This litigation, which has its counterparts around the country, has been nicknamed “Civil

Gideon.” The public interest organization planning this litigation was the Public Justice Center, Inc.
(“PJC”). This was to be next-step litigation in the aftermath of Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md.
2003), a PJC case in which three judges of Maryland’s highest court concluded that Ms. Frase had a
right to counsel in a contested custody case involving her child. The majority, however, comprising
the other four judges, found the claim to be moot.
5 The students received a sixth credit for a segment on research that other faculty members
taught.
6 Since the law school created the Legal Theory and Practice curriculum in 1988, faculty have
added Legal Theory and Practice components to first-year Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law,
Property, Legal Profession, and Civil Procedure courses as well as to a variety of upper-level
courses and seminars. Day division students must take an experiential course — that is, they must
choose from among a number of Legal Theory and Practice courses and clinical courses — as a
condition of graduation.

12

Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors

Vol. 4

second-semester elective. A small, private law firm was counsel in the police
brutality cases, and the Public Justice Center, Inc., a public interest organization,
was counsel in the right-to-counsel cases.
The private lawyers obtained client approval for the students’ work, helped
us to develop the assignments, gave us duplicate case files, taught a class on
police brutality cases, and helped answer student questions during the semester.
In these cases, the students, working under my supervision and that of Professor
Schwinn, interviewed the clients and witnesses and drafted complaints and
discovery requests. After several drafts, which we supervised, the students
provided their final pleadings to the law firm.
The right-to-counsel case generated the major research and writing
assignments for the semester. These were devoted to procedural issues that
Maryland’s appellate courts had not resolved, as well as one of the major
substantive arguments. The volunteer lawyer for the Public Justice Center, a
former Maryland Attorney General, taught a class on the issues in the case, and
he and the organization’s lawyers helped us to develop the assignments.
Students worked on the police cases in groups of two to three, and we met
with each group weekly. For the right-to-counsel case, we worked with the
students, and they with one another, to develop possible legal theories, and then
each student wrote a memorandum. These assignments were relatively openended; i.e., we gave the students real legal issues that had no clear answers and
for which there was no direct precedent.7 We provided these memoranda to the
Public Justice Center lawyers.

II. Benefits of Teaching LRW Courses with
Actual Legal Work
A. Motivating students to learn and apply core
LRW skills
The students in both courses were strongly motivated by the real nature of
the work, even though neither set of students actually represented the clients.
The pretrial litigation students in LRW II did interview the potential plaintiffs in
the police cases, but the appellate advocacy students did not meet Mr. Anthony
until after they had finished their work and he had been released from prison.
What was remarkable was that even this indirect responsibility for the legal problems of
others and this limited personal contact proved to be powerfully motivating. Many of the
students considered the potential plaintiffs and Mr. Anthony to be their clients,
and the students worked on the assignments as if they were. The student
responses to performing actual legal work were very positive.
7 Because we were working under the direction of and with counsel in the cases, our work,
and that of our students, was protected by the attorneys’ and clients’ work-product and clientattorney privileges.
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One appellate advocacy (LRW III) student said: “I think it’s much more
rewarding having a real client,” referring to Mr. Anthony. “I find myself
compelled by his situation, and I have responded, I think, significantly more to
the work and the research and everything that’s involved with this class than I
would with a canned case.” In comparison, this student said that the canned
problems in his prior LRW courses were “exercises quite frankly in tedium and
boredom,” and in those courses, it was “just a matter of doing it by rote” and
getting it “done [so] you can move on.”8
A second student in the course said: “I felt personally challenged to do the
very best that I could here and I like that.” The student explained: “It’s real. We
know that this guy is actually sitting in prison and we’re doing research . . . to
help him get out. [He] got hosed 35 years ago and he shouldn’t be sitting there.”
Referring to the hypothetical parties in a canned problem used in a prior LRW
course, the student said: “Mary Jo and Wally are fictional, and I really couldn’t
care less about their issue . . . . I mean, it’s an interesting argument . . . [b]ut, this
is for real.”9
A third student said that the opportunity to work on a real case was “part of
the incentive to do more work whatever the nature of the research was.”10
The pretrial litigation students (LRW II) had similarly positive reactions.
One said: “I’m never going to forget the name of my first client and I think that’s
something that you don’t realize until after it happens. But, I’m so aware of what
I’ve been doing and the impact this person has had on me . . . . [T]hat’s
something that is going to stay forever with me. It’s really special.”11
A second student in the course said: “[I was] living, and breathing and
sleeping” the case work.12 A third said: “[T]his is hard and this is a lot of work
and I just want to go to sleep at night, but you know, it [referring to the actual
legal work] keeps you focused, at least for me, on a different level.”13
The motivational force of the cases was evident in several ways. The degree
and quality of student participation, both in the classes and work group sessions,
were substantially better than in standard LRW classes.
8 Course Evaluation Discussion with LRW III students (Jan. 22, 2004) (Transcr. on file with
J. ALWD). These comments, and those that follow, were made during one class session in each
course that was devoted to student evaluation. The discussion was recorded and transcribed. The
quantitative and qualitative assessments in the written student evaluations in these two courses
were more positive than those Professor Schwinn and I had received in LRW courses that we
taught with hypothetical problems.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Course Evaluation Discussion with LRW II students (Apr. 28, 2004) (Transcr. on file with
J. ALWD).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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In a process that clinical teachers witness regularly, the
discussions spilled over into informal (but confidential)
conversations in person, on the phone, and through emails.
This is one of the best and most exciting forms of professional
engagement. It produces high quality representation and strong
collegial relationships. It can be exhilarating, challenging,
draining, and fun, and it was all of these things in our two
courses.14
The students’ research was more thorough and creative, and, as I will
describe below, their written analysis also was better than that of students in
LRW courses taught with canned problems. I believe this was due to the
motivational force of the actual legal work and the inherent limits of canned
problems. One appellate advocacy (LRW III) student expressed a common
student view of canned problems: “[T]he canned cases . . . are built around
certain court cases, and there’s ten cases on the one side and ten on the other,
and once . . . you’ve found those ten everything’s good. Whereas, [in this course],
you didn’t know what was out there. You could push a little bit further beyond
the cases.” That is, “[you did a] legislative history” when necessary and “[you did]
all the research that you could possibly do versus just . . . finding those ten cases,
and you’re done.”15
The students’ written analysis was better in two ways. First,
[T]he theories of the case and resulting arguments were better
developed, more persuasive and more nuanced. The students
also found and developed new arguments (ones that we had not
previously identified), and added new components to and
refined the predicted arguments, in ways that students in our
traditional courses generally had not done.
We attribute the enhanced student creativity to the fact that we
had not retrospectively created the argument pathways in the
assignments as we would have with a canned problem, and
thereby predetermined the students’ “answers.” Rather, the
students developed many of these “answers” — in the forms of
theories, arguments, authorities, and facts — through a
dialectical process as we went through the semesters.16
Second, and not surprisingly, given the dynamic nature of the facts in the
actual cases, our students’ understanding and use of the facts also were
substantially better in the two courses than in standard LRW courses.
14 Millemann

& Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 479.

15 Course Evaluation Discussion with LRW II students (Apr. 28, 2004) (Transcr. on file with

J. ALWD).
16 Millemann & Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 480-81.
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For all of these reasons, the quality of the briefs and oral arguments was
better than usual in these two courses. On the other hand, the grammar, syntax,
and style of the students’ writing were not improved. We did not teach these
skills particularly well, and actual legal work did not enhance the teaching we did.

B. Teaching students to deal with factual and legal
indeterminacy
In the analysis above, I describe a paradox that challenged my theory of
LRW teaching. The “best” LRW teaching problems — the ones that are most
carefully planned, controlled, and tested — often undermine development of
some of the most critically important lawyering skills, including creativity and
dealing with factual and legal indeterminacy. Professor Schwinn and I put it this
way:
The creator [of a canned problem] forges the analytical paths
retrospectively, working from the legal authorities, the analysis,
and the arguments, back to the facts. This pre-establishes a
limited number (perhaps just one) of acceptable pathways for
the students to follow. As part of this reverse engineering, the
“question” for the students is defined by the pre-determined
“answer.” And when the students’ authorities, analysis, and
arguments comport with the teacher’s expectations (i.e., when
the students’ prospective paths fall more or less in line with the
faculty member’s retrospective paths), we say that the problem has
“worked.”
…
[This] encourages students to find, rather than construct, legal
arguments. Having created a limited set of acceptable pathways
to an established answer, the LRW faculty member largely has
predetermined the outcomes. Students begin with the
assumption that there are pre-established legal arguments in
every canned problem. They are embodied in a pre-selected and
limited set of case decisions. The goal is to find the “right” set
of decisions and thereby to find the “right” answers.
These features give the canned problem the hallmarks of a
scavenger hunt, with the same payoff: a prize (high grade) to
the winner. In the process, students will learn and develop good
“retrieval” skills. They will learn how to conduct basic research
and find legal authorities. Once they find the authorities, they
will apply them to the predetermined facts and make the best
arguments they can.

16

Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors

Vol. 4

In actual legal work, however, there is no preplanned design, no
“higher intelligence” (i.e., that of a professor) behind the
problem. Instead, it is the lawyer’s intelligence — in our case,
the student’s intelligence — that counts. The lawyer must use
that intelligence to build arguments through a dialectical process
in which facts, legal authority, policies, strategic considerations,
and client goals interact. . . . To do these things, students need
to learn how to create balance (at least, counter-balance in facts
and arguments) and control, which they cannot do when they
are given both.
In the end, many canned problems discourage students from
developing alternative factual theories, legal arguments, and
theories of the case, and ill-equip them to work with
uncertainty and indeterminacy, as they must in practice. That is,
they discourage creativity. Students learn to trace paths, not to
forge them.17
Let me add two important caveats. First, to teach successfully with actual
legal work in LRW courses, LRW instructors must exercise substantial control
over that real material. Establishing the boundaries of factual records and limiting
research and writing to generally identified sets of issues leaves ample room for
student creativity, especially when the students understand, as Professor Schwinn
and I made clear in both courses, that the professor has not invented the
problem or developed the “best” answer to it.
Second, I do not mean to suggest that canned problems have no educational
value. To the contrary, I think they can be very useful, especially the more
sophisticated ones with, for example, rich depictions of clients, pleadings from an
actual case, multi-media materials, and interactive dimensions. I have developed
and taught with such materials, and they can be necessary tools in large
enrollment courses. I have not found, however, that they produce the same levels
of student engagement that I saw in our two experimental courses. Nor do I
think they can be used to achieve some additional educational goals, to which I
now turn.

C. Additional educational goals supported by
actual legal work
First, teaching LRW courses with actual legal work introduces students to a
client-centered, problem-solving method of work. In many classroom courses,
especially those in the first year, clients are either invisible or caricatured. In our
two courses, rather than invisible or made-up characters tacked onto a
“problem,” the clients and their stories posed actual problems, and the students
evaluated legal arguments by asking whether they would achieve the clients’
17 Millemann

& Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 458-59 (emphasis added).
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goals. This added an important dimension to predominantly classroom
instruction.
Second, the cases also provided us with a real basis to critique legal rules,
procedures, and systems. In the appellate advocacy course (LRW III), Mr.
Anthony’s case was a window into criminal law and Maryland’s criminal justice
system. It revealed the limited protections provided by the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, the potential unfairness of
procedural default rules, and the extraordinary elasticity of complicity rules.18 The
police brutality cases provided students with a basis to assess the legal rules
governing detentions, arrest, the use of force, and sovereign immunity; and the
right-to-counsel case invited analysis of our civil legal services delivery system.
Third, as important as any other benefit, teaching first-year students with
real clients and cases reinforces the idealism that many students bring with them
to law school and fight to maintain in the face of the traditional first-year
curriculum. Students, like the rest of us, need to legitimately feel useful to
appreciate the value of being a lawyer. Many of our LRW II and III students
expressed this thought in their evaluations. One said the course helped in
“remembering why we all came to law school. It’s really hard to remember . . .
after one semester of just sitting in a classroom. . . . I know it was a help to me to
remember why I was here.”19 A second student, speaking for others whose sense
of self-worth is undermined by the first-year curriculum, said: “[W]hen we first
looked at the [right-to-counsel case and the extensive legal work that had been
done], I just thought to myself, do they really have enough faith in us [to] think
we’re going to find something that [the lawyer] hasn’t [found] in all of these
papers?” The student noted that he sometimes felt, or was made to feel, “stupid”
in other courses. “But here it was more like [the professors] had faith in us. [They
conveyed that] you can do this; you can solve this problem.” This investment of
confidence, and the student’s work during the semester, made the student come
to believe he could solve the problem.20 Engaging first-year students in actual
legal work on behalf of the poor is the best way, in my view, to prevent student
disengagement from law school.
Finally, involving LRW students in actual legal work can help real people
obtain access to justice. The failure of LRW courses to do this has important
service and educational consequences.
Every year, hundreds of law professors make research and
18 Mr. Anthony was convicted on a “look-out” theory without factual basis, and he spent
over three decades in prison because his trial and appellate lawyer (the same person) provided
ineffective assistance of counsel to him, because he could not adequately represent himself in the
post-conviction process, and because when he tried to do so, he was held to have procedurally
defaulted key arguments.
19 Course Evaluation Discussion with LRW II students (Apr. 28, 2004) (Transcr. on file with
J. ALWD).
20 Id.
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writing assignments to thousands of first- and second-year
students, who spend tens of thousands of hours on them. At
the end of this process, the professors grade the papers, return
them to the students, and discard their copies. This is an
extraordinary waste, akin to gratuitously destroying food in a
community that has many malnourished and hungry people.
It also sends disturbing messages to our students and to the
communities in which our schools are located: that we do not
believe law students have the ability to produce work that is
useful to others, or that we cannot find ways to put their work
to good use. These are implicit, not explicit messages, but we
agree with Howard Lesnick that “much of what we teach is
taught implicitly.”21
Of course, there are challenges in using actual legal work to teach LRW
courses. Spending too much time on access to justice, professional responsibility,
and goals other than core research, analysis, and writing skills can overload a twocredit course. Teachers can develop hybrid LRW–clinic courses or seek to add an
additional credit to the LRW course to pursue some of these goals, or accept the
traditional two-credit limitation and focus on the core LRW goals, harnessing the
motivational power of actual legal work to teach these basic skills.22 Some
students in the two-credit LRW III course felt that there simply was not enough
time (and credit) to handle all that the course required.
The LRW teacher also must be clear about the relationships among
referring lawyers, teacher, and students, and develop policies and agreements that
protect client confidences, or simply decide not to teach with sensitive
information, using hypothetical facts to fill these gaps.23
In addition, one or two students in the LRW III course complained about
being assigned to represent the state against Anthony in a course dedicated to
Anthony’s representation. We could have done a better job explaining why this
role assignment was a critical step in representing Anthony effectively.
Several students in both courses also complained about course
“disorganization.” These students reacted, in part, to changes in issues, theories
of the case, arguments, and facts that were produced by the relatively dynamic
aspects of the courses, and, in part, to our perceived failures, as teachers, to
better anticipate and control the issues in the legal work.
Most important, the LRW teacher must be willing to deal with some
uncertainty and loss of control.
21 Millemann & Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 459-60 (quoting Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of
Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School
Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1158 (1990)).
22 See generally Millemann & Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 491-94.
23 See generally Millemann & Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 494-96.
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All of the good qualities of actual legal work — that it is clientcentered, dynamic, and sometimes indeterminate — make it
more unpredictable than a canned problem. Most issues that
have been screened for merit prove to be meritorious as
predicted; some do not. The facts in a pre-established record do
not change; those in a more open-ended record do.24
Learning how to bring as much order as possible to real-world events is one
of the primary skills of a good lawyer, and it is, after all, the most valuable thing
good lawyers do for their clients in every form of practice. In LRW courses, here
are some useful tips: First, “organize the actual legal work as much as possible. It
can take as much or more time to convert actual legal work into good teaching
material as it does to construct a good canned problem.”25 Second, “[a]ccept that
there will be unexpected developments. Warn the students about this. Teach
about the ways in which lawyers plan for different contingencies. Do this before
the need arises.”26 Third, “[d]evelop contingency plans, e.g., ‘reserve’ assignments
and ‘replacement legal work.’ ” Fourth, “[i]dentify problems as soon as they
develop (semesters go quickly) and make the best mid-course corrections you
and the affected students can. Factor unexpected developments into the grading
criteria to compensate for unevenness in assignments, and tell students you will
do this.”27 Finally, “keep your sense of humor.”28
In her essay in this issue, Professor Kate O’Neill questions whether adding
actual legal work to LRW courses will undermine the goal of introducing
students to “neoclassical reasoning skills.”29 I understand, and accept, the goal of
teaching such skills, which she accurately notes are, or once were, taught in “legal
method” courses. I also agree that “issues in real cases do not necessarily lend
themselves to teaching the components of neoclassical reasoning in any
systematic way” (emphasis added). I have two responses, however.
First, some actual legal work, carefully selected, can lend itself to teaching
such skills. The civil Gideon problem that we used to teach LRW II, for example,
required us — faculty and students — to understand, synthesize, and build on
diverse bodies of right-to-counsel law. Some originated in common law England.
Much is constructed on constitutional, equal protection, and procedural due
process principles that are common to both criminal and civil right-to-counsel
arguments in this country and have developed for almost one hundred years.
There is much here, and in other carefully selected legal work, that supports the
teaching of neoclassical reasoning.

24 Millemann

& Schwinn, supra n. 1, at 496.

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28

Id. at 497.

29 See

Kate O’Neill, But Who Will Teach Legal Reasoning and Synthesis? 4 J. ALWD 21 (2007).
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Second, as Professor O’Neill recognizes, teaching neoclassical reasoning is
one of the primary justifications for the pervasive use of some form of the case
method in not only virtually all first year-courses, but in most, or at least many,
second- and third-year courses. I think her criticism of these courses for
substituting doctrinal instruction for reasoning is more persuasive than her
conclusion that using actual legal work to teach LRW courses is inconsistent with
teaching neoclassical reasoning.
I enjoyed the two experimental LRW courses as much as I have any course
that I have taught in thirty-three years of teaching.30 The substantial majority of
students felt the same way. The courses were hard work, fun, challenging,
interesting, and, I think, successful. I urge LRW and clinical teachers to develop
and test their own models for integrating actual legal work into LRW instruction.
I think you will be glad you did.

30 I have taught over fifteen different classroom courses and a similar number of different
clinical courses.

